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Abstract: In this article, the authors review the relationship between the Commission, the 
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) and national courts in light of the Commission's 
proposals for reform as laid out in the 2006 Review. They focus upon the Article 7 and 
Article 4 procedures of Directive 2002/21. They conclude that the Commission proposals 
leave key questions and their implications outside of discussion and fail to address core 
issues such as the standard of assessment under Article 7, the accountability for 
decisions taken upstream of the NRA, and the scope and depth of judicial review. 
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his article takes a fundamental look at the uneasy triangular 
relationship between the Commission, the national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) and national courts in the light of the Commission 
proposals for reform as laid out in the 2006 Review 1. It focuses in particular 
on two interrelated issues, namely the interaction between NRAs and the 
Commission through the procedure of Article 7 of Directive 2002/21, and 
review of NRA decisions by national courts, as set out in EC law in Article 4 
of Directive 2002/21 2.  
T 
                     
1 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Ecnomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Review of the EU 
Regulatory Framework for electronic communications networks and services COM (2006) 334 
final, Brussels June 29th 2006 and the accompanying Commission Staff Working Document 
SEC (2006) 816, Brussels June 28th 2006. 
2 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 7th 2002 on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services 
(Framework Directive) [2002] OJ L108/33 
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  Preliminary issue: the nature of regulatory decisions 
Before dealing with the Article 7 and Article 4 procedures, however, it is 
useful to reflect on the nature of the decisions taken in regulatory procedures 
concerning electronic communications. 
These decisions take place against a context of uncertainty regarding the 
evolution of the sector. Uncertainty is common in many sectors of the 
economy, but there is a general consensus that the evolution of 
communications is especially hard to predict. This is certainly the case with 
respect to technology. Indeed, besides the few cases of "calculated 
success" (GSM), recent history is littered with instances of unforeseen 
technological developments that shook up the sector (the rise of the 
internet), as well as predictions that failed to materialize (convergence 
stories of the early 1990s) or were outright failures (work on HDTV 
standards in the 1990s). Technological uncertainty is compounded, in the 
current context, by the liberalization wave of the 1990s, which led to more 
open markets. This implies firstly that technological progress is now a 
competitive factor, thus increasing the chances that operators and providers 
will try to introduce differentiated technological solutions and leave the 
market (i.e. customers) to choose what it prefers 3. Moreover, competitive 
pressures might accelerate the rate of technological evolution 4. Secondly, 
as a consequence, marketing might now be as important a factor as intrinsic 
technical quality in determining technological evolution 5.  
The main challenge for lawmakers and regulatory authorities is to factor 
uncertainty properly into their course of action. The current EC electronic 
                     
3 Alternatively, if it is thought that a single solution should be adopted beforehand, market 
players (equipment and software manufacturers, operators, providers) might fight a standards 
battle behind the scenes before a technological advance is brought to the market. Witness the 
high-stake game that surrounded the specification of the 3G standard. 
4 Pressure to salvage existing copper pair local loops in the face of impending competition from 
cable might have played a role in research leading to the various xDSL standards in the past 10 
years (the authors do not have any evidence regarding this point). Certainly, in retrospect, it 
would have been a massive waste to embark on a large-scale program of laying fiber in the 
local loop in the 1990s, as was advocated before xDSL arrived to give a new lease of life to 
copper pairs. That experience would dictate caution before enacting any legal measure that 
would mandate the laying of fiber in the local loops throughout a given territory, at least before 
this technology has proven its usefulness and attractiveness to customers (in the form of 
demand for services that can only be provided via local fiber networks). 
5 Witness the golden age of ISDN as a beefed-up internet access technology in the 1990s and 
the prevalence of SMSs today: none of these two technologies were designed for the respective 
uses which made them famous. Good marketing and network effects did the trick. 
P. LAROUCHE & M. de VISSER 127 
communications framework takes that uncertainty into account, for instance 
by relying on an economic analysis (inspired by competition law) for the 
most significant part of regulation (the SMP procedure), and by introducing 
the principle of technological neutrality. 
By now, another consequence of that uncertainty should also be 
acknowledged, namely that there is no right answer to most – if not all – 
major regulatory dilemmas. Instead, regulatory decisions essentially tend to 
involve policy trade-offs. For instance, short-term gains in consumer welfare 
from lower prices and increased competition routinely have to be weighed 
against longer-term gains from investments in new technologies and 
increased dynamic efficiency 6. Similarly, the interests of one category of 
customers often have to be balanced with those of another category 7.  
If regulatory decisions involve trade-offs, then not only is there no right 
answer, but furthermore the decision cannot be modelled as a simple two-
step process, namely the setting of a norm (by an institution endowed with 
legislative powers) and its application to a set of facts (by an institution 
endowed with executive/administrative powers). 
It seems more accurate to model the process as a chain of decisions, 
each involving a further refinement in the trade-offs, always with a view to 
dealing with uncertainty as effectively as possible. At each step, complex 
inquiries and trade-offs are involved, ranging from the choice between 
symmetric and asymmetric regulation to the choice of cost basis and its 
implementation. 
It is against that background that the procedures governed by Articles 7 
(Commission review and veto) and 4 (judicial review by national courts) will 
be examined. 
                     
6 This is, of course, the core of the debate concerning investment in so-called next generation 
networks. 
7 The regulation of mobile termination rates implied that the interests of the users of fixed 
communications (who paid high termination rates to call mobile subscribers) were given priority 
over those of mobile subscribers (who benefited from the net wealth transfer from fixed to 
mobile), contrary to the previous staus quo. Of course, most fixed users are also mobile 
subscribers now, so that the overall wealth transfer might not have been that considerable. 
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  NRAs and the Article 7 procedure  
In line with subsidiarity and in order to heed the specificities of each EU 
member state, the regulatory framework for electronic communications 
entrusts NRAs with the main role in the implementation and enforcement of 
the law. NRAs take the main regulatory decisions that shape this very 
significant sector of the economy. Legally, NRAs must be independent from 
the market players and in practice, they have typically been given a large 
measure of independence from the government as well. Many felt that NRAs 
could turn out to be overzealous or ineffectual, thereby undermining the 
objectives of the broader regulatory reform. A number of mechanisms were 
put in place in the regulatory framework to ward off that risk as far as 
possible, including Article 7 of Directive 2002/21. 
Article 7 is the cornerstone of the relationship between the Commission 
and NRAs, and to a large extent between NRAs as well. Three years of 
practical application have brought a number of issues to the fore with 
respect to Article 7 procedure that warant attention. This section will discuss 
the role of the NRA in the broader regulatory scheme (a) and, as the other 
side of the coin, the role of the Commission in relation to NRA decisions (b). 
In particular, what should be the standard for Commission review under 
Article 7 (c)? Finally, how does, and how should, the Article 7 procedure 
impact on relationships between NRA, notably as regards regulatory 
competition between them (d)?  
What is the role of NRAs in the electronic communications regulatory 
framework? 
The role of NRAs can be defined narrowly or broadly. The narrow 
definition would limit the NRA to a fact-finding function. The NRA would then 
deliver added value because of its closeness to the playing field, which 
makes it better able to ascertain the situation accurately. Nevertheless, it 
would essentially be "filling in the blanks" in order to complete processes 
where the main decisions have been taken elsewhere. The broader 
definition would also ascribe a policy-making function to the NRA. The NRA 
would then not only engage in fact-finding, but also enjoy the ability to make 
certain policy determinations, to the extent that the trade-offs made earlier in 
the decision-making chain would need further refinement. 
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The EC electronic communications framework does not expressly choose 
between these two models, but there are a number of significant indicia that 
point towards the broader definition 8. Furthermore, the practice since 2003 
shows that NRAs see themselves as endowed with policy-making functions 
and actually engage in policy-making. At any rate, the NRAs acting 
collectively in the ERG do deal with policy issues, which would imply that 
they individually possess the power to deal with those issues.  
What is the role of the Commission under the Article 7 procedure? 
Here there are also, broadly speaking, two options. On the one hand, the 
Commission could be seen as a form of review instance, which double-
checks on the decisions made by the NRAs. On the other hand, the 
Commission could also be seen as a party in the original decision-making 
chain, together with legislative instances and NRAs. It would then be in 
charge of certain elements in the chain. 
The setup of the EC electronic communications framework on this point 
falls into line with general principles of EC law: the second option is to be 
preferred. Indeed the SMP procedure (pursuant to which most NRAs 
decisions are taken) rests on a division of tasks between the Commission 
and the NRAs: the Commission, via the Guidelines on market definition and 
SMP 9 and the Recommendation on relevant markets 10, already carries out 
a significant portion of the SMP procedure. By doing so, it effectively sets the 
parameters for the work of NRAs 11. As the recitals to Directive 2002/21 
indicate 12, the Commission is entrusted with this task in its capacity as 
"guardian of the Treaty", given that (i) EC competition law, where the 
Commission has the lead role, is used to providing guidance for market 
definition and assessment; and (ii) some coordination is needed in the 
interest of the internal market. Article 7 should be seen in the same light: the 
Commission must be consulted because of its obvious interest in 
                     
8 Including the list of policy objectives at Article 8 of Directive 2002/21, the latitude left to the 
NRAs in the choice of remedies and their powers concerning scarce resources. 
9 Infra, note 13 
10 Infra, note 12. 
11 See P. LAROUCHE "Coordination of European and Member State Regulatory Policy – 
Horizontal, Vertical and Transversal Aspects", in D. GERADIN & N. PETIT (Eds), Which 
Regulatory Authorities in Europe? (Edward Elgar Cheltenham, 2005). 
12 See in particular Recitals 27-28. 
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competition law and the internal market, and it even receives a limited veto 
right to safeguard these interests. The Commission therefore participates in 
the SMP decision chain because of its specific tasks and for the sake of 
specific interests. It therefore cannot be seen as a general review instance 
that would police the action of NRAs.  
Furthermore, such a role would be at variance with general principles of 
EC law, first and foremost subsidiarity and national procedural autonomy 13. 
According to these principles, member states are in charge of the 
implementation of EC legislation (as reflected here in the role of NRAs as 
front-line players under electronic communications regulation) and they are 
also in charge of the procedural conditions for such implementation, 
including the review of decisions made by the national administration.  
In the end, therefore, the role of the Commission under Article 7 is not to 
review NRA decisions fully, as this would infringe upon member states' 
autonomy in setting the procedural and institutional framework for 
safeguarding the rights of individuals bestowed upon them by EC law. 
Moreover, a full review would introduce an inefficient duplication of review. 
Rather, the Commission's role under Article 7 is no different than at other 
stages in the SMP procedure: the Commission is one of the players, and it is 
given a role in view of the specific interests (EC competition law, internal 
market) that it is meant to safeguard. General and full review of NRA 
decisions can thus be seen to rest properly with national courts.  
What should be the standard for Commission intervention  
under Article 7 of Directive 2002/21? 
From the above, it would follow that the Commission should intervene 
under Article 7 only when the specific interests it must protect are at stake. 
Indeed, this is proven by the text of Article 7(4), where the parameters of the 
veto right are set out. The Commission can launch the Article 7(4) procedure 
(two-month suspension of the NRA draft measure with a possible veto) if "it 
considers that the draft [NRA] measure would create a barrier to the single 
market or if it has serious doubts as to its compatibility with Community law 
                     
13 The principle of subsidiarity is laid down in Article 5 second indent EC. The doctrine of 
national procedural autonomy has been developed by the Court of Justice in its case law, 
starting with Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v 
Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989. 
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and in particular the objectives referred to in Article 8 [of Directive 2002/21]". 
A mere disagreement with the NRA accordingly does not suffice for resorting 
to a veto: the Commission must show that the measure envisaged by the 
NRA would prejudice either the internal market or EC law (including 
competition law) 14.  
Moreover, given that the draft decisions under review involve trade-offs, 
without there being a right answer, it is sensible not to veto an NRA unless 
there is a significant conflict with Community law. 
In the light of the information presented above, the Commission, when 
acting under Article 7(4) of Directive 2002/21, should intervene only when 
the draft measure proposed by an NRA is such that it will hamper the 
internal market (on the basis of concrete evidence) or that it will significantly 
conflict with Community law. In its Article 7, which took effect in 2003, the 
Commission has indeed allowed diverging measures (or at least diverging 
lines of reasoning) to stand in a number of situations. Yet in its 
Communication on the Article 7 procedure 15 and in its 2006 Review 
Communication 16, the Commission sets a different standard, namely 
"consistency" or "coherency" across the EU. These terms are not defined 
any further, yet it is difficult to escape the conclusion that they mean a single 
harmonized solution across the EU. 
The Commission decision vetoing the draft measure of the German 
NRA 17 effectively illustrates the difference between the standard outlined 
above and a "consistency/coherency" standard 18. The Commission vetoed 
the draft measure because it departed from what other NRAs had done 19, 
without, however, explaining how that measure would have hampered the 
internal market or significantly clashed with Community law. Under the 
                     
14 The case-law of the ECJ concerning harmonization (Case C-376/98 Germany v. Parliament 
and Council ("Tobacco Advertising") [2000] ECR I-8419, para. 84; see the most recent 
pronouncement in Case C-154/04 Alliance for Natural Health [2005] ECR I-6451, para. 24-43) 
requires evidence of a negative impact on the internal market – going beyond mere differences 
between national laws – for harmonization to be justified. 
15 Consolidating the internal market for electronic communications, COM(2006)28 (6 February 
2006) at 6, 9. 
16 Supra, note 1 at 4, 8-9. 
17 Then the Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post (RegTP), now the 
Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA). 
18 Market 9 in the Recommendation on relevant markets, supra, note 12. 
19 Commission decision of May 17th 2005, Case DE/2005/144, available at: 
 <forum.europa.eu.int>. 
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standard outlined above (as opposed to "consistency/coherency"), this draft 
measure should not have been vetoed. 
The "coherency/consistency" standard put forward by the Commission 
could, in fact, stem from a misconception of the precedent value of 
competition law decisions. There is informal evidence 20 to the effect that 
the Commission takes a strategic view of decisions taken by NRAs. Given 
that the SMP framework is inspired by competition law and that NRAs are 
supposedly following competition law principles when defining and 
assessing markets, the Commission would be worried about allowing any 
undesirable precedent to be set, and conversely would perhaps even like to 
establish some favourable precedents under electronic communications 
regulation, which could subsequently be used in the application of 
competition law. While this worry is understandable, it is misplaced. Firstly, 
based on a proper understanding of the role of the Commission in the 
Article 7 procedure and of the applicable standard, as set out above, the 
Commission does not approve or disapprove of the substance of NRA 
decisions, it rather exerts a specific form of control to safeguard the internal 
market and Community law in cases where serious doubts arise. Secondly, 
and more fundamentally, the market definition and market assessment 
conducted in a given case does not have a strong precedent value for 
subsequent cases, even if they concern the same products or services. 
Market definition and market assessment are intimately linked with the 
individual circumstances of each separate case, and therefore the precedent 
value of competition law decisions is limited, as the CFI (Court of First 
Instance) aptly noted in GE/Honeywell 21. This is all the more true in cases 
where a regulatory decision intended to be based on competition law is 
invoked in subsequent competition law proceedings. 
From a practical perspective, and perhaps more provocatively, the value 
of coherency/consistency across the EU should not be exaggerated. Driven 
to its logical end, only an EU-level regulator can provide complete 
coherency/consistency. Given the institutional choices made with the 
electronic communications framework, it is unavoidable that some 
discrepancy will arise between NRA decisions. As set out further below, 
such discrepancies can be advantageous in a context of uncertainty.  
                     
20 The authors wish to apologize for not being able to substantiate this point more solidly at this 
juncture. 
21 Case T-210/01 General Electric v. Commission, not yet reported, at para. 118-120. 
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In its 2006 Review Communication, the Commission proposes to extend 
its veto right, pursuant to Article 7(4) of Directive 2002/21, to the remedial 
stage of NRA decisions as well 22. Of course, the need for a veto is not just 
theoretical: on market definition and SMP assessment, the Commission has 
already been called upon to issue five veto decisions to date, and exercise 
informal pressure to ensure the withdrawal of thirteen further draft measures, 
which otherwise would also have been subject to a veto decision.  Extending 
the veto power to cover remedies would thus not seem too drastic a 
measure to be pursued. It could further contribute to reducing the tension 
between the deregulatory goals of the 2003 framework and the increasing 
amount of regulation: NRAs often impose the heavier remedies – a 
Commission veto could perform a useful check as to whether these heavier 
remedies are indeed the most appropriate ones. 
However, the existence of a veto power potentially puts the Commission 
in a hierarchically superior, controlling position vis-à-vis NRAs. In the light of 
the preceding paragraphs, the Commission proposal is problematic. 
Remedies are where the NRA can best attune its decision to national 
circumstances, which might not be properly appreciated by the Commission. 
Furthermore, NRAs have sought to ensure a measure of coordination as 
regards remedies, as well through the adoption of a Common Position on 
Remedies in the context of the European Regulators Group (ERG) 23. 
Extending the Commission veto power to remedies would be sensible only if 
the role of the Commission and the standard used under Article 7 were also 
clarified along the lines set out above. In any event, it might be preferable to 
work instead with the ERG: the Common Position on Remedies can be 
further improved, and the ERG should be encouraged to engage more 
systematically in benchmarking and peer review. 
Should there be "regulatory emulation" between NRAs, and if so, how? 
In an earlier paper, one of the authors described how the current EC 
electronic communications framework – then still being finalized – could 
open the door to a form of "regulatory competition" between NRAs, which is 
perhaps better described as "emulation" 24.  
                     
22 Supra, note 1 at 8-9. 
23 Supra, note 15. 
24 M. CAVE & P. LAROUCHE, European Communications at the Crossroads – Report of the 
CEPS Working Party on electronic communications (Brussels: CEPS, 2001) at 17-26. 
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At a more fundamental level, extending the Commission veto power – if 
understood as a control of consistency and coherency across the EU – to 
remedies would also shatter any remaining hope of seeing some form of 
"regulatory emulation" emerge within the EU. Such emulation can occur as a 
result of market pressures or more simply as a result of NRAs searching 
around for better solutions by comparing and benchmarking with others. 
Considering the inherent uncertainty surrounding most of the major 
regulatory decisions, as outlined at the outset, some measure of "learning-
by-doing" seems quite appropriate, in order to avoid the risk of massive 
failure if all authorities followed the same approach, imposed in a top-down 
fashion. In addition, NRAs are closer to the playing field and can respond 
more flexibly to new developments than when their action must be 
coordinated at EC level. An important pre-condition for these positive effects 
to occur, however, is that NRAs do take a European approach and engage 
with the work of their peers. 
Such a bottom-up emulation process is not necessarily indicated in all 
cases. A trade-off must therefore be made between the advantages of 
consistency and those of learning-by-doing via slight discrepancies. The 
former are mostly static and the latter, dynamic. Obviously, where there is 
broad consensus already (for example, in retail markets), it might be 
preferable to insist more on consistency. Where a number of reasonable 
options are open to the regulatory authority, on the other hand, allowing 
some measure of divergence might be sensible to reduce the risk of failure, 
even if it imposes some costs in the shorter-term. Experience should then 
make it easier to discern which option is more adequate. At first sight, one 
might think that such situations arise only with regard to remedies, but 
emulation might also be useful for certain issues relating to market 
definition 25 and the assessment of SMP 26.  
Where relying on emulation was appropriate, we should have witnessed 
NRAs from smaller jurisdictions attempting to innovate on regulation 
("maverick" behaviour) in order to try to position their jurisdiction more 
strongly in comparison to larger jurisdictions. Other NRAs would have kept a 
close eye on these developments, in order to see which of the maverick 
                     
25 For example, whether cable and DSL are in the same market for broadband access (Market 
12) and transmission of broadcasting signals (Market 18). 
26 For example, the presence of collective dominance for mobile call origination (Market 15) or 
the impact of countervailing buyer power on the SMP findings for smaller providers of call 
termination (Markets 9 and 16). 
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NRAs appeared to have made the best choice for its jurisdiction. 
Discussions would have ensued within and outside of the ERG, with some 
benchmarking and other similar exercises, until some best practice(s) finally 
emerged. NRAs from larger jurisdictions would typically have refrained from 
maverick behaviour, given that the gains to be achieved for them would have 
been dwarfed by the risk of losses in case regulatory choices turned out to 
be inappropriate. They would have moved at a later point, and their 
decisions would most likely have established what the best practice was 
found to be. 
Instead, we have witnessed the following since 2003. Typically, an NRA 
from a large jurisdiction takes the lead in conducting market assessments 
and deciding on remedies. Historically, this role fell to the British Ofcom (and 
its predecessor Oftel), but it appears that other NRAs, in particular the 
French ARCEP, are also assuming this role nowadays. The Commission is 
closely involved with this NRA, and will endorse its approach. Subsequently, 
in its Article 7 comments on draft measures presented by other NRAs, the 
Commission will stick to the line set out in the first major case, all the more 
so if it considers that it must achieve "consistency" and "coherence" across 
the EU. As a result, NRAs from smaller jurisdictions are prevented from 
engaging in maverick behaviour. Similarly, NRAs – from larger or smaller 
jurisdictions – that come late with their draft decision will have little if any 
room to stray from the "consensus". 
"Regulatory competition" has thus failed to emerge since 2003. That 
outcome can be explained by historical factors. Ofcom (then Oftel) has 
always enjoyed a leadership status since its inception in 1981; perhaps the 
Commission and NRAs have been conditioned to follow the lead from one of 
the larger jurisdictions and cannot shake off the habit. That outcome can 
also be explained, however, by the Commission's use of a 
"consistency/coherency" standard in its Article 7 practice. 
  Accountability, judicial review  
and the role of national courts 
The prime mechanism to hold authorities to account in the current EC 
electronic communications framework is judicial review by national courts, as 
provided for in Article 4 of the Framework Directive. The same 
considerations – including subsidiarity – that dictate that NRAs must have 
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the primary responsibility for the implementation of the regulatory framework 
in principle leave it to member states to devise the judicial structures within 
which such decisions can be challenged. However, in electronic 
communications regulation, the need for a proper judicial review mechanism 
was felt strongly enough to warrant that a number of procedural rules be 
fixed in EC law directly, at Article 4. The mechanisms of both Article 4 and 
Article 7 offer a check on the considerable discretion and wide competences 
of NRAs: Article 7 allows the Commission to safeguard certain interests 
(internal market, Community law) in the course of the decision-making 
procedure, while Article 4 calls upon national courts to ensure ex post overall 
control of the finished end-product.  
Accordingly, whilst accountability is the basic concern, this section will 
take judicial review by national courts as a starting point, in order to discuss: 
the interpretation of a ‘challengeable act' (a); the court or tribunal with 
jurisdiction to review the challenged act (b); the proper breadth and depth of 
judicial review (c); and finally, the effectiveness of judicial review (d).  
For which acts should authorities be accountable? 
The conventional view would suggest that since only NRA decisions at 
the end of the chain actually affect the rights and obligations of individual 
undertakings directly, accountability would be sufficiently ensured via judicial 
review of these. This view, however, ignores the practical realities of 
regulation in the electronic communications sector. NRA decisions are 
greatly influenced by activities that take place earlier in the decision-making 
chain. 
Firstly, Commission recommendations and guidelines (hereinafter the 
"Commission soft-law instruments") determine the scope and exercise of 
NRA actions. Articles 14(2) and 15(3) of Directive 2002/21 expressly provide 
that NRAs must take these measures into account when carrying out the 
SMP exercise 27. The Commission has indicated that the extent to which 
NRAs have indeed done so is an important factor in the assessment of the 
                     
27 See also Article 19 of Directive 2002/21, calling upon NRAs to take the utmost account of 
recommendations issued under that legal basis. It should be noted that it is thus the Community 
legislature obliging NRAs to take into account soft law instruments, adding considerable legal 
force to this duty. 
P. LAROUCHE & M. de VISSER 137 
proportionality and legality of NRA decisions under Article 7 28. In practice, 
the Commission instruments are thus highly influential and it would seem 
particularly apposite that the Commission should be accountable for them. 
Secondly, the ERG is developing as an important institutional player, 
whose actions also have considerable ramifications for NRA decisions 29. It 
is likely that these documents will be followed by NRAs in individual cases, 
for the simple reason that NRAs (as ERG members) have been actively 
involved in the drafting and adoption of these documents. Moreover, the very 
purpose of ERG Common Positions is to coordinate decision-making 
practices across the European Union 30. Accordingly, while an undertaking 
faced with an adverse NRA decision can challenge that decision before a 
national court, its ability to do so will be hampered if the NRA can hide 
behind an ERG documents. Some form of accountability mechanism – 
judicial review or otherwise – for ERG documents would thus be 
advisable 31.  
Finally, the Commission "letters of comment" issued pursuant to Article 
7(3) of Directive 2002/21, its "serious doubts" letters and veto decisions 
pursuant to Article 7(4) all circumscribe NRA discretion in the decision-
making process. NRAs are bound to heed the latter, while they are well-
                     
28 Para 7. Currently, the phraseology of Article 7(4) is also wide enough to accommodate a 
Commission veto for the (sole) reason of failure to follow the Guidelines. 
29 Examples of ERG documents include Common Positions on remedies (ERG (03)30, now 
replaced by ERG (06)33), wholesale international roaming (ERG (05) 42 and ERG (05)20 
Rev1), wholesale bitstream access (ERG (03)33Rev1 and ERG (03) Rev2) and accounting 
separation (ERG (05) 29). In addition to ERG Common Statements, there are also ERG 
Reports which allow NRAs to engage in benchmarking, e.g. the Report on Broadband market 
competition, ERG (05)23, Report on Transparency of retail prices, ERG (05) 52, the Report on 
Experiences with Market Definition, Market Analysis and Applied remedies, ERG (05)51 and the 
Public Mobile Termination Rates Benchmark ERG (06) 24. 
30 Compare in this respect also the wording of Article 7(2) of the Framework Directive, stating 
that in order to ensure the consistent application of the 2003 Directives, NRAs and the 
Commission shall "seek to agree on the type of instruments and remedies best suited to 
address particular types of situations in the market place". 
31 If it would prove unpracticable to subject ERG documents to judicial review, an alternative 
option would be to open the ERG procedures and make them more transparent. The model of 
the NPRM under the US Administrative Procedure Act (APA) could be used by analogy. The 
ERG would then issue a notice that it intends to deal with a given issue, setting out what the 
points to be decided are, what its options are and which information it would like to obtain from 
market parties and other participants in the procedure. The ERG would then build up a file, 
perhaps conduct hearings, and then reach a conclusion, in which it would address the 
submissions received. The U.S. procedure can be branded monstrous and unwieldy, if one 
looks at the amount of paperwork and resources that go into it, but it does force the authority to 
listen to observations and engage them in its decision. In the absence of judicial review, this 
may be the best safeguard. 
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advised to take the "serious doubts" letters into account in order to avoid a 
veto. As for the letters of comment, the Commission sometimes points 
therein quite precisely to weaker elements in the draft NRA decision 32.  
In sum, there are four parts of the decision-making chain that should be 
subject to some accountability mechanism (judicial review or otherwise): 
Commission instruments (guidelines and recommendations); ERG output; 
Commission comments under Article 7 of the Framework Directive and NRA 
decisions. Given that only the latter are currently subject to judicial review, 
there is at first sight an accountability deficit in the decision chain of EC 
electronic communications regulation. 
Who is best placed to carry out judicial review? 
On the assumption that some form of judicial review might be the easiest 
means of introducing accountability for the acts discussed above, several 
institutions come into question.  
At this juncture, given that only NRA decisions are actually subject to 
judicial review, national courts are the natural forum and this much is 
recognized in Article 4 of Directive 2002/21, giving them the competence to 
decide on appeals against NRA decisions. However, national courts can 
also be something of a ‘loose cannon' in the general scheme of EC law. The 
current electronic communications framework does not at any point attempt 
to induce national courts to see the EC dimension of regulation. There is 
thus a risk that an NRA, even if acting suitably in line with the EC 
consensus, can be overruled by a national court, if the latter's perspective 
remains confined to the member state in question. This danger is all the 
greater since EC electronic communications law is couched in directives, so 
that the implementing national legislation often obscures the EC dimension. 
This defect can be remedied, however. The EC perspective of national 
                     
32 As the experience with mobile origination in Ireland shows, the elements on which the 
Commission expresses reservations can end up being those on which the decision falls before 
national courts. There the Irish Communications Appeal Tribunal annulled the decisions of the 
Irish NRA (ComReg) finding that Vodafone and O2 had collective dominance on the Irish 
wholesale mobile access and origination market and imposing a series of remedies, Decision 
No 08/05 of the Electronic Communications Appeal Tribunal in respect of Appeal Numbers 
ECAP6/2005/03, 04, 05, 06, 07 and 08. Both decisions had been duly notified to the 
Commission under Article 7(3) of Directive 2002/21.and although the Commission made 
observations, it did not initiate the procedure of Article 7(4), Case IE/2004/121, DG Greffe 
(2005) D/200269, Brussels January 20th 2005 
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courts can be strengthened by informal measures, such as training courses 
provided by the Commission, or an exchange programme for judges. 
Furthermore, national courts could be given the express competence to ask 
the Commission for information of a factual, legal or economic nature 33. 
Finally, if national courts were required to notify their judgments relating to 
electronic communications to the EC level, the Commission could then, as it 
has done in EC competition law, compile an electronic database in which 
national judges can access decisions by their counterparts on the same 
issues they are grappling with.  
National courts, however, are not suitable for judicial review of the other 
three categories of documents. Under Community law, Commission soft-law 
instruments as well as Commission comments pursuant to Article 7 cannot 
be challenged before national courts. As far as ERG output is concerned, 
national courts cannot truly be expected to engage in an examination of the 
ERG output upon which the NRA decision is based. They might also feel 
uneasy questioning a document that has been drawn up and endorsed by all 
NRAs, as well as by the Commission.  
For these three categories of documents where national courts appear 
unsuitable, judicial review could be entrusted to the Court of Justice. The 
ECJ (European Court of Justice) seems the natural forum for Commission 
soft-law instruments and Article 7 comments and decisions. It also seems 
better placed than a national court to entertain a challenge to ERG 
documents, i.e. ‘final' documents that have been promulgated as such and 
are expressly intended for ‘external' usage. The ECJ/CFI is used to review 
economic policy matters and furthermore is best equipped to take the 
European dimension of the ERG actions into account. However, 
Commission recommendations – and a fortiori guidelines and other soft-law 
instruments – seem immune from scrutiny: they are expressly excluded from 
the ambit of Article 230 EC 34. As regards ERG documents, it must be noted 
that the ERG is not a Community institution within the meaning of Article 230 
EC; even if this were the case, the ERG output probably does not fall under 
                     
33 On the model of Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003 for competition law. While the comments 
made by the Commission in the course of the Article 7 procedure will already be of considerable 
assistance to national courts, it cannot be excluded that national courts require further 
elaboration on the Commission’s thinking or want the Commission’s input in assessing how the 
NRA has dealt with the Article 7 comments. 
34 Of course, the ECJ could always find that a recommendation is in fact a decision without the 
name, but this appears unlikely. It is interesting to note that the original proposal for the 
Framework Directive provided for a decision on relevant markets and not a recommendation. 
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the list of acts that are covered by that Article 35. Judicial review would thus 
require an amendment to the constituent decision for the ERG, providing for 
the possibility of a judicial challenge before the ECJ 36. Even if these hurdles 
are overcome, locus standi remains a problem. Under the current 
interpretation of Article 230 EC, challenges to general acts by private parties 
are not possible and individuals are, moreover, unlikely to succeed in 
demonstrating the requisite individual and direct concern to be found 
admissible 37. The undertaking to which the NRA decision now vetoed was 
addressed might perhaps be able to claim standing applying the TWD case 
law 38 per analogy. But competitors who have merely been involved in the 
national procedure giving rise to the Commission decision will see their 
challenge fail because of the inability to show ‘direct and individual concern' 
under Article 230 EC 39.  
A third option could be to conceive of the Commission as a judicial review 
instance for NRA decisions. However, establishing the Commission as a 
(general) review instance would be at odds with the purpose of the Article 7 
procedure and fly in the face of well-established general principles of 
Community law.  
Finally, a European Communications Appeal Tribunal (ECAT) could be 
created. The advantage of this option is that it would be possible to 
concentrate all judicial review actions relating to EC communications law in a 
single court. The ECAT could thus accumulate the requisite experience and 
expertise to effectively dispose of judicial challenges. A single European 
tribunal would moreover be intimately familiar with the European dimension 
of the communications rules. This option is theoretically pleasing, but 
disconnected from practical realities. Member states will, for constitutional 
                     
35 It is expressly provided in ERG Common Positions that they do not possess legally binding 
effects and a perusal of the text of Article 230 EC makes clear that the Community Courts only 
decide on the legality of binding acts. 
36 This approach is taken with respect to the decisions of a number of European agencies. 
37 Case 25/62 Plaumann and Co v Commission [1963] ECR 95; reaffirmed in Case C-50/00 P 
Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR II-6677. 
38 Case C-188/92 TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [1994] 
ECR I-833. 
39 Admittedly, there is always the possibility of an indirect challenge pursuant to Article 234 EC. 
However, this route is beset with problems. Firstly, it is uncertain as the market party will have 
to wait for a negative – and challengeable – decision to be adopted by the NRA and then hope 
that the national court where he challenges this decision will actually decide to send a 
preliminary reference to the ECJ. Secondly, the preliminary reference procedure is cumbersome 
and lengthy, making it particularly inappropriate for a sector as dynamic as e-communications. 
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reasons, be loathe to surrender judicial scrutiny for decisions of national 
state organs to a European body.  
In the end, there is a clear danger of too much judicial review. Numerous 
steps of the decision-making chain, which are, it must be remembered, all 
part of one and the same translation of general policy into individual 
decision, would be susceptible to judicial challenge. In the simplest terms, 
this amounts to an unnecessary waste of resources. It also leads to 
considerable uncertainty among market operators and authorities alike as it 
will not be easy to determine when an NRA decision is final and must thus 
be obeyed. The answer to this problem involves a trade-off between the 
effectiveness of regulatory decisions (in the widest sense of the word) and 
protection of individual rights. We have not yet been able to conduct a more 
elaborate analysis of this problem with the help of economic tools. At this 
point in time, we would tentatively argue that it might be preferrable to have 
a single shot at in-depth judicial review and that this shot should occur where 
the "hunch" is in the decision chain, i.e. where the transition between 
general policy and (individual) decision takes place.  
What should be the breadth and depth of judicial review? 
This section seeks to address the problem with the interface between 
Article 4 of the Framework Directive and national legal systems. Article 4 
gives national courts the competence, and indeed imposes the obligation 
upon them, to take the ‘merits of the case duly into account'. This phrase in 
Article 4 is a reaction to case law where national courts used their 
jurisdiction to annul NRA decisions on primarily formalistic grounds, which 
was seen as counterproductive 40. They restrictively interpreted the 
competences of NRAs and often found them wanting, leading to the 
                     
40 Cf. the following statements from the Commission Annual Implementation Reports: "In many 
cases the courts are empowered to reach decisions on appeal only on the procedural aspects 
of the case". [Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Sixth 
Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package Brussels, 
December 7th 2000 COM (2000) 814 14] and "The practice under the existing framework has in 
many cases been for the appeal bodies to examine process rather than substance." [Eight 
Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory 
Package, Brussels 3.12.2002 COM (2002) 695 final 53]. This was the case notably in the 
Netherlands, see, for example, M. ANDENAS & S. ZLEPTNIG, "Telecommunications Dispute 
Resolution: Procedure and Effectiveness" [2004] 15, European Business Law Review, 477, 543 
et seq. 
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annulment of their decisions. It is important to appreciate why national courts 
ended up annulling NRA decisions on formal grounds. On the Continent, a 
number of national legal systems do not readily admit that independent 
authorities be given wide, discretionary powers, usually for reasons of a 
constitutional nature. The primacy of politics dictates that major decisions 
must be made by, or under the authority of, elected officials, although it has 
been shown that traditional constitutional principles are difficult to reconcile 
with the realities of regulation in the electronic communications sector and 
the decision chain model. Many courts felt uncomfortable with the onset of 
independent regulatory authorities and hence strictly controlled competence 
issues. Article 4 attempts to address this problem by stipulating that 
Community law requires a control of NRA decisions that goes beyond 
procedure, the effectiveness of control being of ever greater importance 
considering the enhanced position of NRAs under EC communications law. 
To recall, the aim behind Article 4 is to bring about effective judicial review. 
This aim is to be achieved by broadening the breadth of judicial review to 
encompass procedure and substance. This is evident from inter alia the 
German, French and Dutch language versions of the provision which speak 
of "Ümstanden des Falles"; "le fond de l'affaire"; and "de feiten van de 
zaak" 41. The English version speaks of "merits". English law operates 
according to a fundamental distinction between the role of courts on appeal 
and the role of courts on review 42. Judicial review attaches to the procedure 
according to which the decision was arrived at, which includes scrutiny of the 
contested decision for errors of fact and law 43. On appeal, conversely, the 
correctness of the decision as such is under question, and courts are more 
interventionist. In English law, consideration of the merits is only possible in 
appeal. By mandating a review of the merits, Community law thus requires a 
full appeal of Ofcom decisions. In other words, where the aim of Article 4 
was to dictate the breadth of review, in response to undesirable behaviour 
on the part of Continental courts, it impacts on the depth of review in 
Common law courts, with the concomitant danger that the appeal body might 
indeed develop into the shadow regulator feared by Council 44.  
                     
41 The Dutch translation is arguably too narrow; substance involves more than looking at the 
facts of the case at hand. 
42 Kemper Reinsurance Company v Minister of Finance [2001] 1 AC 1 at 14. 
43 The test of judicial review is that first set out in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v 
Wednesbury Corporation [1947] 2 All ER 680, and now summarized by Lord Diplock in GCHQ 
(n 31) to encompass illegality (unlawfulness), irrationality (unreasonableness) and procedural 
impropriety (unfairness). 
44 Indeed, in the context of competition law, the CAT when dealing with appeals against 
decisions by the OFT has not shown any great deference, for example, Institute of Indepenent 
P. LAROUCHE & M. de VISSER 143 
Article 4 might thus go too far where it need not do, and not far enough 
where it ought to. Its emphasis on the breadth of review ignores the fact that 
even if a court duly takes the substance of the matter into account, that is 
not the sole determinant of the outcome of the case. Equally, if not more 
important, is the depth of review. As such, Article 4 does not guarantee that 
Continental courts will amend their behaviour to develop into the effective 
control instruments the Commission aims for 45. Furthermore, the effects 
that Article 4 (presumably unintentionally) has on the depth of review in 
Common Law countries might go beyond the effects it should have 46. Even 
if a court is competent to inquire into the "merits" 47 of any particular case, 
presumably it should only annul the decision under attack in "extreme" 
cases, namely those where the decision under challenge is blatantly wrong 
or inappropriate or where fundamental principles 48 or procedural rights 49 
have not been respected. Article 6 of the Framework Directive provides for 
extensive consultation with stakeholders. Market parties have thus had the 
opportunity to communicate their point of view and convince the NRA. A 
court should not subsequently re-do the NRA's work.  
                     
Insurance Brokers v Director General of Fair Trading 1002/2/1/01(IR) [2002] CAT 2; Aberdeen 
Journals v Director General of Fair Trading 1009/1/1/02 [2003] CAT 11; BetterCare Group 
Limited v Director General of Fair Trading 1006/2/1/01 [2002] CAT 7; Freeserve.com PLC v 
Director General of Fair Trading 1007/2/3/02 [2003] CAT 5; IBA Health Limited v Office of Fair 
Trading 1023/4/1/03 [2003] CAT 27; Hutchison 3G (UK) v Office of Communications 
1047/3/3/04 [2005] CAT 39. 
45 The Commission has also been having some difficulty in ensuring that all member states 
indeed provide for national courts to take the merits of the case into account. 
46 In principle, judicial review should be sufficient, especially given the intensity of judicial 
review as applied by the CAT. Consider, for instance, Unichem Limited v Office of Fair Trading 
1049/4/1/05 [2005] CAT 8, where the CAT favourably noted the similarity of the scope of judicial 
review in merger cases by the UK and the Community Courts. The CAT has to review mergers 
using judicial review principles. 
47 Merit is often loosely used by non-common law lawyers to refer to the substance of the case, 
as opposed to the procedure followed. 
48 In EC communications law, examples would include the regulatory principles as set out by 
the Commission in the 1999 Green Paper, such as non-discrimination, or the objectives listed in 
Article 8 of the Framework Directive. 
49 Such as audi alteram partem, where the authority is acting ultra vires or if the decision does 
not contain a statement of reasons. 
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The effectiveness of judicial review:  
the non-suspensive effect of appeals  
The last point to discuss in relation to judicial review concerns the 
suspensive effect of appeals. In order to avoid the automatic suspension of 
NRA decisions pending the outcome of judicial proceedings as practised in 
many member states, a provision was included in the Framework Directive 
to the effect that appeals do not automatically suspend the NRA decision 
being challenged, although the competence of national courts to order 
interim measures (i.e. suspension) remained unaffected. The provision has 
not delivered the desired result. Suspension is still granted too readily in 
some jurisdictions, with all the concomitant damaging effects for the 
establishment of a competitive e-communications market.  
The Commission proposal to amend Article 4 to specify the conditions 
under which NRA decisions can be suspended pending appeal is therefore 
to be welcomed.  
  Conclusion  
The Commission proposals remain superficial. They leave key questions 
and their implications outside of discussion and fail to address core issues. 
Legislatures, policy-makers and lawyers should appreciate the uncertainty 
that characterizes the electronic communications sector in devising the 
institutional framework and relationships between the various players. In 
particular, traditional conceptions on judicial review and accountability 
cannot be applied without at least some degree of modification. Secondly, 
the role of the Commission under Article 7 of Directive 2002/21 and the role 
of national courts under Article 4 of that Directive need sorting out. The 
Commission should be clearly conceived as party in the original decision-
making chain and not as a general review instance. Moreover, the threshold 
which must be met before a veto can be pronounced should be more 
stringently phrased to require proof of a serious prejudice to the internal 
market or Community law. Amending the role of the Commission along 
these lines should also allow for a greater degree of regulatory competition 
amongst NRAs than is currently the case, which, in turn, is in keeping with 
basic principles of EC law as subsidiarity and national procedural autonomy 
and can contribute to a more prominent role for the ERG as regards peer 
review and benchmarking. The role of national courts is squarely that of 
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reviewing NRA decisions for general compliance with the law. While the 
intensity of review should be higher than that exercised by the Commission 
under Article 7, it should not lead to a judicial practice where NRA decisions 
are annulled simply because the courts would have preferred another 
outcome. Thirdly, as regards accountability of Commission instruments and 
comments and ERG documents, an economic analysis of the decision-chain 
model should be employed to determine which part of the decision-making 
chain should be susceptible to more in-depth judicial review. For those other 
parts, accountability can be ensured through more marginal review or 
through opening the procedure for the adoption of the measures concerned 
and making them more transparent. 
 
